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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1014 
____________ 
 
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS, 
     Petitioner 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the  
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to W.D. Pa. Crim. No. 2-15-cr-00168-001) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
April 23, 2019 
Before:  CHAGARES, RESTREPO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed May 22, 2019) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner Frederick Banks is currently awaiting trial in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on charges of interstate stalking, 18 
U.S.C. § 2261(a)(2), aggravated identity theft, § 1028A(a)(1), making false statements,  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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§ 1001(a)(3), and wire fraud, § 1343.  In an order entered December 12, 2017, the 
District Court determined, inter alia, that Banks is competent to stand trial, but 
incompetent to represent himself.  Banks filed a petition for writ of mandamus pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1651, seeking an order directing the District Court to allow him to 
represent himself at trial, and to appoint standby counsel.  For the following reasons, we 
will deny the mandamus petition.  
Traditionally, use of the writ is appropriate “to confine an inferior court to a lawful 
exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its 
duty to do so.”  Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).  Banks alleges 
that the District Court did not lawfully exercise its jurisdiction in denying his right to 
self-representation.  However, the remedy of mandamus is “a drastic one, to be invoked 
only in extraordinary situations.”  United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 593 (3d Cir. 
1992).  To justify the use of this extraordinary remedy, Banks must show both a clear and 
indisputable right to the writ and that he has no other adequate means to obtain the relief 
desired.  See Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992).  Because Banks 
can raise the issue in a direct criminal appeal should he be convicted, he has not shown 
that he has no other alternative means of relief.  See United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 
120, 127-37 (3d Cir. 2002) (reviewing the issue after conviction); Flanagan v. United 
States, 465 U.S. 259, 267-68 (1984) (“post-conviction review of a disqualification order 
is fully effective to the extent that the asserted right to counsel of one’s choice is like, for 
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example, the Sixth Amendment right to represent oneself”); cf. United States v. Gooch, 
850 F.3d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 2107) (“[t]he district court did not deny defendant the right to 
counsel by allowing him to self-represent”); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 
168, 177 n.8 (1984) (holding that the denial of the right to self-representation “is not 
amenable to ‘harmless error’ analysis”).   
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.1 
                                              
1 Banks’ motion filed with this Court on February 20, 2018, is denied.  To the extent he 
seeks an order directing the District Court to appoint counsel, the motion is moot as the 
District Court has appointed new counsel.  Banks’ challenge to the District Court’s 
determination that the period of delay stemming from this mandamus petition is 
excludable under the Speedy Trial Act should be raised, if necessary, in a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).  See Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 
506-07 (2006).  Banks’ emergency motion filed on March 21, 2019, is denied as 
unnecessary to the extent that it seeks expedited consideration of this mandamus petition.  
It is granted to the extent that it seeks judicial notice of a state court order granting 
Banks’ right to self-representation on appeal.  The “Motion to Disclose FISA Electronic 
Surveillance” is denied; to the extent that the motion seeks mandamus relief, Banks has 
not shown a clear and indisputable right to the writ.  Finally, in an effort to clear up any 
confusion in the District Court, we note that there are no further matters pending in this 
Court regarding Banks’ competency either to stand trial or to represent himself at trial. 
